59 Griffith Place, Waterford - Case Update

The High Court of Ireland has ruled that a bank’s retrospective ratification of a receiver’s appointment many years after the receiver carried out his duties was valid, but that the receiver’s actions in breaking the locks to gain possession to a property constituted an unlawful trespass, albeit a “technical” one.

In July 2012, the receiver was appointed over two properties owned by the defendants — 59 Griffith Place, Waterford (the Griffin property) and 1.8 De Bruin Court, Poleberry, County Waterford (the De Bruin property) — by ACC Bank.

The receiver’s agents sought to take possession of the Griffin property in September 2012, but were met with stern resistance. In August 2013, the High Court granted interlocutory relief sought by the receiver restraining the defendants from preventing the receiver from taking possession of the properties. An appeal was unsuccessful.

The De Bruin property was subsequently sold by ACC in November 2016.

The first main issue raised by the case was whether ACC could retrospectively ratify the appointment of the receiver in 2015 after discovering an issue with the original deed of appointment. The Court ruled that it could, relying on various authorities (including Brennan v O'Connell [1980] IR 13) where it was held that ratification operates retroactively so as to render the transaction valid ab initio.

The second main issue raised by the case was whether the breaking of a lock to premises can be regarded as peaceable re-entry. The Court declined to follow Hafeez v CPM Consulting Limited [2020] IEHC 536, where a landlord’s re-entry and taking possession of a restaurant premises by changing the locks was deemed to be peaceable. The Court instead chose to follow authorities (including ILG limited and others v Aprilane Limited [2024] IEHC 42) to the effect that the issue of whether an entry is forcible or not does not turn on the degree of force used, and that the breaking of locks does not constitute peaceable re-entry. Therefore, the Court concluded that what occurred was not peaceable re-entry but was forcible.

However, the Court found that the trespass was only “technical in nature and that it would be practically impossible to put a compensation value on that trespass and that justice will be done between the parties by an appropriate order for costs”, and invited the parties to make submissions on costs.

The Court also rejected an argument by the defendants that the De Bruin property was sold at undervalue.

The decision can be accessed HERE.